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Why realize experimental games 
with farmers? 
The application of framed field experiments 
can provide valuable insights into the multiple 
layers (individual-, group- and incentive-level) 
relevant to understanding collective action in 
conservation (Cardenas et al, 2004) and the 
pathways through which conservation 
behavior is affected by external institutions. 
To learn about people’s preferences and 
decision-making in real resource and group 
contexts, research in real field contexts is 
needed (Cardenas, 2000; Swallow et al, 
2005). There is a growing body of literature 
analyzing cooperative behavior in the 
management of natural resources in field 
framed experiments conducted in developing 
countries (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008; 
Cardenas, 2009).  
However, there has only been limited 
application (Narloch et al, 2012; Midler et al, 
in press) in the context of (i) managing 
agrobiodiversity, and (ii) the impact of reward 
systems, such as payment for ecosystem 
services (PES). This emerging body of 
literature suggests that although individual 
Policy implications 
arise from the fact 
that design features 
of incentive 
mechanisms can 
involve an apparent 
trade-off between the 
costs of investing in 
social equity 
dimensions (in terms 
of procedural and 
distributional equity) 





rewards (i.e. rewards proportional to effort) 
are likely to be more effective and less 
sensitive to social factors than collective (i.e. 
egalitarian) rewards, the latter might have a 
positive effect on conservation when they are 
shared within socially closely-related groups 
and in situations where communication and 
deliberation about collective action is 
possible.  
Behavior in the farmer experimental 
games suggests that understanding 
farmer perceptions of fairness can have 
important implications for the design and 
implementation of conservation incentive 
mechanisms, particularly given the 
important influence of such perceptions on 
the pro-social behavior that underlies much 
de facto conservation. Incentive 
mechanisms, such as payments for 
agrobiodiversity conservation services 
(PACS), that can, in the words of Bowles 
(2008) "support socially-valued ends not only 
by harnessing selfish preferences to public 
ends but also by evoking public-spirited 
motives" are also more likely to be 
sustainable over the long-term.  
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As the Peruvian government moves 
closer to implementing an up-scaled 
PACS scheme1   
for quinoa, amaranth and other crops, 
the importance of gaining improved 
understanding of how such a scheme 
may be designed in practice to be 
both effective and account for 
procedural justice (including the 
recognition of perceptions of fairness) 
has become increasingly critical.  
Setting up the experimental 
games 
This new round of games explores 
how effective (in terms of conservation 
outcomes) individual/proportional 
rewards are compared to collective/
egalitarian rewards, depending on 
whether the way those rewards are to 
be shared is imposed exogenously 
(top-down) or endogenously (bottom-
up). In the bottom-up endogenous 
approach, groups have the 
opportunity to decide collectively 
which payment (proportional to effort 
or egalitarian) method they prefer to 
receive via a voting procedure. These 
two variables (group formation and 
type of reward) are designed to test if: 
 different reward types would affect 
behavior in terms of conservation 
outcomes;  
 involving farmers in the process of 
choosing the reward type to be 
implemented would impact 
conservation outcomes; and 
 
 the constitution of groups – 
random or autonomously selected 
– affected conservation outcomes. 
Carrying out the 
experimental games 
Games were carried out between 
February and March 2016 in seven 
Aymara and eight Quechua 
communities around the Titicaca basin 
in Peru, involving 252 participants in 
total. The communities were selected 
with the assistance of local experts 
covered communities known to be 
interested in the maintenance of 
quinoa landraces. The games were 
applied to community groups of 12-20 
participants, divided into a number of 
sub-groups of four each.  
Each participant in each community 
sub-group played a sequence of three 
games. Each sequence is called a 
treatment. Four treatments were 
played with sub-groups formed 
randomly (treatments 1 to 4) and two 
with farmers allowed to autonomously 
select their own sub-groups (treatment 
5 and 6). Table 1 summarizes 
treatment combinations.  
Following the experimental game, a 
socioeconomic survey was conducted 
with each participant, collecting a 
range of data including demographic 
information, landholdings, and family 
relations, distance between group 




 Table 1. Experimental Games Sequence/Treatment Combinations 
TREAT-
MENT 
SUB-GROUP        
FORMATION 
GAME 1 GAME 2 (REWARD TYPE) GAME 3 
1 Random groups Baseline Baseline Baseline 
2 Random groups Baseline Top-down Egalitarian reward Baseline 
3 Random groups Baseline Top-down Proportional reward Baseline 
4 Random groups Baseline Bottom-up reward Baseline 
5 Autonomous selection Baseline Top-down Egalitarian reward Baseline 
6 Autonomous selection Baseline Top-down Proportional reward Baseline 
Farmer experimental games in the community of Moro, district of Paucarcolla, Puno, 
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1 Developed at the request of the Peruvian Ministry of Environment (MINAM) and with a number of preparatory elements/recommendations 
now incorporated into MINAM‘s 2015 programme of work, see: Drucker, A. G. 2014. Incentivos para la Conservación de los Recursos 
Genéticos de la Agrobiodiversidad: Perfil de un Programa. Lima, Peru. MINAM/MEF/Euro Eco Trade.  
  
Main ﬁndings  
 When imposed by an external 
entity, proportional rewards 
increase conservation effectively 
while egalitarian rewards do not. 
 When farmers have the possibility 
to choose between both types of 
rewards, they prefer the egalitarian 
one. As a result, they end up 
making lower levels of conservation 
and thus have lower payoffs. 
 When farmers can choose their 
preferred reward type, the 
egalitarian one performs better 
than when it is imposed. This 
suggests that allowing farmer 
communities to determine their 
own group reward mechanisms/
conditions may be expected to 
increase their willingness to 
participate and thus undertake 
conservation activities. 
 When farmers can choose their 
group peers, they conserve/
cooperate more than when their 
group is randomly assigned. 
 No crowding-in or crowding-out of 
intrinsic motivations relative to the 
baseline was found following 
removal of the incentive 
mechanism. 
Implications for designing 
conservation incentive 
mechanisms 
 Improved understanding how 
group social dynamics and reward 
mechanisms affect conservation 
behavior, including through an 
exploration of issues of 
“fairness” (both distributive and 
procedural) and how this can 
impact willingness to participate in 
group reward schemes. 
 Support for the current design of 
PACS schemes in Peru and 
elsewhere, with their high levels of 
"procedural justice" (i.e. farming 
communities free to choose to 
participate or not, select which of 
the priority landraces to conserve, 
identify specific farmer group 
participants and lands upon which 
to realize such activities, as well as 
determine their own level of in-kind 
rewards and whether these will be 
distributed on an egalitarian or 
proportional basis). 
 Findings point towards policy 
implications arising from the fact 
that there is an apparent trade-off 
to be overcome between the costs 
of investing in social equity 
dimensions (in terms of procedural 
and distributional equity 
dimensions) and the benefits of 
obtaining more effective 
conservation outcomes. 
 Identification of new applied areas 
of research, for example related to 
what design features of incentive 
mechanisms that secure 
procedural justice minimize 
transaction costs and at the same 
time reap the benefits of more 
effective outcomes? Such possible 
tradeoffs may be important to 
account for and ways to do so can 
be sought through complementary 
framed field experiments and more 
qualitative focus groups with 
potential PES implementers and 
experts in the area who would be 
able to suggest ways in which 
transaction costs may vary through 
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